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Abstract:  
This paper adresses a specific question: why has China grown so rapidly and Brazil not? To an-
swer this question, it (i) establishes the basis for comparison between China and Brazil by con-
textualizing these countries within the BRICs concept, and (ii) presents a comparative analysis of 
Brazilian and Chinese reforms focusing only on the issue of macroeconomic policy, especially 
the monetary and exchange rate regimes, and its effect on growth. 
Keywords: China, Brazil, economic policy, economic growth. 
JEL Classification: E44, F43. 
INTRODUCTION 
In October 2003, a Goldman and Sachs’ report (Wilson and Purushothaman, 
2003) argued that global convergence trends augured well for certain large 
emerging markets and that these would soon displace traditional European 
economies and, in one case, even Japan and the United States, in terms of mar-
ket size by the year 2050. These countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China (known by the acronym BRICs), were likely to offer some of the best in-
vestment opportunities in the coming decades. The team continued to ‘dream’ of 
BRICs over the next few years, producing a number of papers (for instance, 
O’Neill, Wilson, Purushothaman, and Stupnystka, 2005) which reinforced their 
original argument through new favorable data. In 2007, O’Neill published Brics 
and Beyond, a full-length book which collected essays that analyzed the trajecto-
ries of the BRICs countries, and other possible markets. In the introduction, 
O’Neill wrote that since the original paper on the BRICs countries was written, 
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the equity markets in the BRICs countries had expanded tremendously and that 
Goldman and Sachs continues to be bullish about them.  
Brazilians, on the other hand, who have heard that their country is the coun-
try of the future for more than half a century, are likely to ask what sort of impos-
sible dream Goldman and Sachs is selling. After all, regardless of equity market 
growth, between 2000 and 2007 Brazil averaged only 3.4% economic growth. 
Goldman and Sachs’ Paulo Leme was sanguine about this, writing “Brazil has 
underperformed not only relative to our expectations but also compared with all 
the other BRICs. Since 2003, real GDP growth rates in China, India and Russia 
have averaged 10.2%, 8.0% and 6.9%, in each case far exceeding our estimates 
of their long-term potential (4.9%, 5.8% and 3.5%, respectively)” (Leme, 2007). 
Leme expected Brazil to reach a target 5.0% economic growth, given the suc-
cess of macroeconomic stabilization programs, though he believed that the sec-
ond Lula da Silva government would be unlikely to carry out the reforms 
necessary to allow for an acceleration of economic growth.  
This paper aims to answer a very basic question asked by not only Brazil-
ians, but people in other developing countries where liberal reform agendas were 
oversold, namely: why has China grown so rapidly and Brazil not. To answer this 
question, the paper is divided in four sections. Section 1 establishes the basis for 
comparison between China and Brazil by contextualizing these countries within 
the BRICs concept. An interesting point of divergence among the BRICs is in the 
area of economic growth and reforms: the BRIC countries which pursued liberal 
reforms more aggressively and holistically (Russia and Brazil in the 1990s) grew 
far slower than those who were more heterodox (China since the 1980s, and 
India in the 1990s). This is counter-intuitive since conventional wisdom holds that 
China and India’s growth have largely been the result of freeing up their econo-
mies. Section 2 aims at a partial explanation by surveying the results of a gene-
ration of Washington Consensus era growth. Something approaching a 
consensus now exists over the lack of effectiveness of universally applicable 
holistic reform programs. Section 3, given the agnosticism about total liberal 
packages and the puzzle of why incomplete reformers grew better, presents a 
comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese reforms focusing on the issue of 
macroeconomic policy, especially monetary and exchange rate regimes, and its 
effect on economic growth1. That is, the inflation targeting and flexible exchange 
                                                     
1 It is important to mention that this paper aims to explain the difference in economic 
growth performance in Brazil and China by analyzing and comparing only the macroeco-
nomic policy that has been implemented in the Brazilian and Chinese economies since the 
1990s. It does not mean, however, that some economic reforms, such as, tax reform, 
labor reform and social security reform and labor costs and productivity are not relevant to 
explain the growth rates in Brazil and China.   
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rate regime used by the Brazilian government, since 1999, has contributed to 
slow start-stop growth and has been relatively high inflation, while the more ma-
naged approaches favored by China have done the reverse. Finally, the paper 
concludes that, in the light of Chinese experience, contracyclical economic poli-
cies and capital controls can assure sustainable economic growth to the develo-
ping countries. 
1. DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES AMONG THE BRICS COUNTRIES 
The appeal of the concept of BRICs countries to international businessmen is 
straightforward: these four countries possess sufficient market size and ability to 
influence and be influenced by the international economy to make them attractive 
sites for investment. Once proposed as a group, the concept of BRICs was 
quickly adopted by economists and investment banks (O'Neill Wilson, Pu-
rushothaman, and Stupnystka, 2005; O’Neill, 2007). It has resonance with other 
social scientists who have long distinguished important developing countries from 
smaller and less important peers (Chase, Hill and Kennedy 2000; Armijo, 2007). 
In many aspects, such as historical legacies, culture, and regime type, to 
name but a few, there is little to bind the BRIC countries. In the area of economic 
policy reform, however, there are certain important similarities though they pro-
duce varied results. This analysis of economic policy reform can be considered 
an interesting case of most similar analysis (Gerring, 2007, Chapter 5). Most 
similar case analysis approaches offer significant leverage because they are well 
positioned to explore causal mechanisms that may be obscured in studies with 
high numbers of cases (‘large N studies’, George and Bennett, 2005). This is 
particularly important because of the indeterminacy that ‘large N studies’ (see the 
next section) show in terms of liberalization and growth in general. 
All four countries had economies where state intervention was considerable 
up until the 1980s (Brazil and China) or 1990s (Russia and India) and all have 
moved considerably in favor of freeing market actors and reducing the role of the 
state. The governments in each of these countries entered the post-World War II 
period, with a very clear awareness of a need to catch up and with a belief that 
governments should either actively fill market gaps or that they should wholesale 
collectivize productive activity. Post-War policies involved state-led growth through 
ambitious multi-year industrialization plans with considerable variety in degrees of 
success. All pursued policies that were decidedly inward in orientation and Brazil, 
India and China, displayed little interest in trade, save traditional sectors which 
were increasingly disadvantaged by macroeconomic policies. The Soviet Union 
economy, while more global in orientation, understood its trade profile as part of a 
larger context of Communist solidarity and its trade was determined by political 
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motivations more so than by traditional concerns of price, productivity and quality. 
Thus, while the Soviet Union was engaged in trade, it did so through the Council 
of Mutual Economic Assistance, a relatively closed association.  
In addition to being relatively closed economies, credit had been cheaply 
provided through the extensive presence of government in credit markets. Public 
development banks (Brazil, India, and China) or government monopolies in ban-
king (USSR) directed low cost capital to sectors favored by government plans. 
While planning was more significant and effective in the USSR and India then in 
China2 and Brazil, in all cases, private financial markets were ‘repressed’ (Beim 
and Calomiris, 2000). The rise in global interest rates, sharp fall in oil prices and 
global consumption in the early 1980s exposed many structural weaknesses in 
the models pursued by all four countries. Particularly, varying mixtures of increa-
sed indebtedness to external creditors, rising inflation, food and goods shortages, 
and persistent fiscal deficits plagued Brazil, the USSR, and India, while China 
suffered from rising inflation, and heavy state and quasi-state debt. A perception 
that domestic market processes had been exhausted, inability to access viable 
external credit markets, and external shocks lead to crises in the four countries 
encouraged all of these governments to pursue reform (Brazil 1980s, 1990s, 
1998-9, and 2002-3; USSR 1980s; Russia 1991-1999; India 1990-2; and China 
1981, and 1989-1992, the latter being more domestic in orientation). Overwhelm-
ingly, the reforms prescribed by economists and policy makers involved liberali-
zation, such as labor, financial, capital, and foreign exchange markets. 
The BRICs countries differed in the speed, pace, and content of the reforms 
that they implemented, as well as the amount of pressure they endured from 
international financial institutions and trading partners. Nevertheless, all moved 
towards liberalizing their economies to degrees unknown by any of those coun-
tries for most of the twentieth century. Importantly, all moved towards transfor-
ming state-owned enterprises into private or mixed partnerships whose 
performance would be determined by market rather than political conditions, 
increasing the role of domestic and foreign (China to a lesser extent) participation 
in capital markets, felixibilizing labor contracts and rights, and welcoming foreign 
and domestic private investment, particularly in industries once considered sensi-
tive or part of national security (again, China to a much lesser extent). 
Given these similarities, what is telling is the stark difference in economic 
growth over the last decade. More specifically, given that the explanation of the 
growth of China and India is normally understood as the result of liberalization, it 
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is important to address why liberalization did not have the same effect in Brazil 
and Russia (in the 1990s)3. 
Before turning a focused comparison on differences between Brazilian and 
Chinese reforms, it is worth reviewing the literature on reforms and economic 
growth to see if this literature provides an answer, or at least some clues, as to 
why Brazil is not just another BRIC in the wall. 
2. ECONOMIC REFORMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The trend to liberalize in the 1980s was thought to be the remedy to the prob-
lems of stagflation. Stagflation was a problem in developed countries but it was 
devastating in developing countries where growth shocks were more pronoun-
ced, inflation rates were much higher, citizens had fewer savings, and govern-
ments had currencies which were ineffective stores of value. The need to resume 
economic growth was, thus, more pressing in developing countries but the usual 
small-scale reforms seemed inadequate to solve egregious levels of price insta-
bility, deteriorating currency value, and slow or negative growth. In short, develo-
ping countries faced graver problems and had fewer policy instruments available 
to address those problems. 
Policy makers centered in Washington and many US-trained technocrats in 
developing countries believed that structural reforms were needed, reforms that 
would liberalize markets and rationalizing the state activity. The assumption was 
that this would reduce inflation and allow growth to return. Though it has been 
severely vilified in retrospect, the Washington Consensus was primarily an at-
tempt to show the consensus among economists about the need to correct struc-
tural weaknesses and restore growth (Williamson, November 2002). Certain 
commonalities existed among the many countries and regions in the world which 
had been hit hard by the rise in oil prices, the global recession in the early 1980s, 
and its aftermath. These conditions included high or hyper-inflation, overvalued 
exchange rates, excessive indebtedness (often incurred in a foreign currency), 
rigid labor markets, inefficient tax collecting agencies, and lack of credibility of 
monetary policy makers, among others. Many reformers believed that state inter-
vention in markets had distorted incentives creating conditions of moral hazard, 
                                                     
3 Ferrari Filho and Paula (2006) show the remarkable difference in economic growth per-
formance of the more liberal and holistic reformers (Brazil and Russia under Yeltsin) and 
the more heterodox reformers (China, India, and Russia under Putin). Even if the Russian 
case is not considered due to its heavy dependence on petroleum and natural gas prices, 
the contrast between Brazil and India and China is stark. 
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crowding out private actors, and prioritizing employment over productivity. At the 
same time, a remarkable consensus emerged among economists that favored 
positions held by classical economists –such as that inflation is primarily a mone-
tary phenomenon (Blustein, 2003). The increased consensus around liberal 
ideas, the rise of a scientific and mathematical approach to economics, the co-
llapse of command economies in Europe, and the liberalization of China reinfor-
ced an impression of technical infallibility to economic theory (Guilhot, 2005). 
Economists and policy makers spoke of getting the (macroeconomic) ‘fundamen-
tals’ correct or getting prices ‘right.’ In such an environment, the Washington 
Consensus quickly moved from ten policies which emerge from a sum of cumula-
tive wisdom of the discipline of economics to a complete set of rules to be follo-
wed closely and in tandem4. Not without some credibility did supporters and 
critics call it the “Ten Commandments.” 
Problems emerged relatively rapidly because although economists ‘knew’ 
that these prescriptions were correct, evidence was weak and, sometimes, con-
tradictory. Stallings and Peres (2000) found that some reforms had positive ef-
fects on growth and inequality, whereas others did not. This led to debates about 
the importance of sequencing, with authors arguing that certain reforms needed 
to be done before others. Political scientists and political economists pointed to 
the absence of attention to institutions and argued that rule of law, a competent 
judiciary, governability, and other issues were necessary for economic transitions 
(Haggard and Webb, 1994). Such institutional reforms were considered ‘com-
plementary’ and part of a ‘second generation’. These reforms were more difficult 
because they involved more political maneuvering and implementing govern-
ments required more political support in order to sustain such changes. Finally, 
another debate emerged, based largely on comparative analyses of the experi-
ences of the People’s Republic of China and the former Soviet Union Bloc coun-
tries, about the virtue of ‘shock therapy’ versus gradual reform (Nolan, 1995; 
Aslund, 2002; Hui, 2005). 
Interestingly, most proponents in the various debates believed that reforms 
were good, necessary, and applicable in all cases. The problem lay in timing, 
political will, or passing additional reforms to make the first set work more effi-
ciently. The crisis in Asia in 1997 began to chip away at that perspective. For 
instance, Rodrik (1998) led the charge against blind support of liberalism and 
globalization arguing that particular policy approaches might work better than a 
dogmatic set of policies. Particularly challenging to liberals, though somewhat 
overstated, was the importance played by capital controls in the Malaysian re-
                                                     
4 This does not mean that countries indeed followed all ten. In fact, most countries em-
phasized only a few policies though there were less dedicated efforts to complete the list.  
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sponse and recovery (Haggard, 2000). This sparked a debate among economists 
(Larraín, 2000) about the virtue or dangers of capital controls but discussions of 
holistic problems with the Washington Consensus were largely muted, though it 
was clear that problems abounded. The collapse of Argentina in 2001 was par-
ticularly traumatic because the stylized impression was that Argentina had been 
a ‘poster child’ of the Washington Consensus and if it –and its convertibility sys-
tem– was dead and buried, so should ‘neoliberalism’ (Blustein, 2006).  
Stiglitz (2002) unleashed a number of critiques of the Washington Consen-
sus which were particularly important given his position as former Chief Econo-
mist at the World Bank. Thus, he suggested a number of reforms, a ‘post-
Washington Consensus,’ which were more likely to produce sustainable and 
equitable development. In a reflective piece, Williamson (November 2002) replied 
by recognizing that on certain policies he may have overstated the amount of 
consensus among economists, but he largely stood by the ten principles he initia-
lly laid out. What is rather remarkable is that not only Williamson, but many of his 
critics, believed that there is a particular set of reforms will bring about growth 
although evidence increasingly suggested otherwise. They disagreed on which 
reforms and the pace and sequencing, but there is a considerable amount of faith 
in reform agendas writ large. Particularly exemplary of such faith-based econom-
ics can be found in Williamson’s reflections on the Washington Consensus ten 
years later (see, for instance, Rodríguez, 2006).  
And yet, the path to growth does not seem to be paved with one set of reform 
policies. In a series of articles, Easterly shows that stabilization and adjustment 
programs and economic reforms do not effect growth and the income of develop-
ing countries in 2000 is remarkably correlated (0.87) with their 1960 income (see 
review in Sindzingre, 2005). Hausmann and Rodrik (2005) find that despite being 
“a star reformer” El Salvador was not a “star performer” and Hausmann, Rodrik, 
and Velasco (2005), in a comparative analysis of El Salvador, Brazil, and the 
Dominican Republic, show how implementing certain ‘correct’ reforms could ac-
tually be harmful. In their study of reforms in Latin America, Stallings and Peres 
(2000) found that reforms lacked perfect complementarity, and that financial libe-
ralization often had negative effects. Similarly, using a larger data set, Eichen-
green and Leblang (2002) and Rodrik (1998) show that it is difficult to establish a 
robust relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth perfor-
mance for developed and, especially, emerging countries. Examining all regions 
from 1975-2000, Rodríguez (2006) argues that the data correlating openness 
and economic growth is very inconclusive.  
This is not to say that reforms have no effect on growth, only that the rela-
tionship is more complex than conventional wisdom suggests. What is increas-
ingly evident is that ‘large N time series studies’ of economic growth provide little 
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support for liberal agendas producing growth. In the case of the BRIC countries, 
the evidence is somewhat mixed. China’s remarkable growth over the last quar-
ter of a century is, no doubt, partially due to liberalizing its markets and shedding 
a very sclerotic economic structure. At the same time, the Chinese state has 
been far too involved in production, regulation and planning to discount state 
developmentalist approaches (Onis and Senses, 2005). Similarly, Russian 
growth has occurred during periods of reversal of liberalization and the reclai-
ming of planning on the part of the state (Ferdinand, 2007). Of course, most of 
this has consisted of a recovery of income to pre-collapse times and has occu-
rred during a phenomenal boom in petroleum and natural gas prices which ma-
kes it more difficult to assess the role of the state in generating growth. Similarly, 
although Indian growth was weak in per capita terms for most of the pre-reform 
years, and has been robust since “there is no statistically valid break in the series 
in 1991, implying that, so far, on a trend basis, GDP has continued to grow since 
1991-2 at the same rate as it did during the previous decade-at 5.7% per year” 
(Nagaraj quoted in Adams, 2002). In the case of Brazil, reforms appeared pie-
cemeal during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was not until the presidency of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1994-2002) that comprehensive reform 
agenda was proposed and largely implemented (Spanakos, 2004). Hyperinflation 
was eliminated and inflation was brought under control, though the country re-
mained susceptible to external shocks. While this constituted a clear and palpa-
ble improvement, post-stabilization growth has been weak. The divergence of 
growth outcomes is not surprising given that academic literature has not found a 
significant improvement of total liberal packages on economic growth and has 
found some individual reforms to be negative.  
The next section of this paper aims to look in a more focused manner at two 
cases of macroeconomic policy reform within the developing world, Brazil and 
China, which show vastly different policy approaches and results. The aim here 
is to explore in greater depth the policies pursued by these two countries to un-
cover differences which may provide causal mechanisms that explain divergence 
in economic growth outcomes.  
3. MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: THE EXPERIENCE  
OF BRAZIL AND CHINA  
Given the above discussion, it is suggested that the menu of liberalization did 
not produce the growth that was expected while less liberalized systems grew 
more robustly. The argument is a bit more precise than this as liberalization is not 
bad per se but reforms in certain areas do introduce aspects which weaken 
growth sustainability. This section will argue that selective macroeconomic poli-
cies explain the difference in growth performance between the Brazilian and Chi-
nese economies. This revives the debate over exchange rate regimes (floating 
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vis-à-vis managed) and capital controls in emerging markets, a debate which 
intensified given exchange rate and financial crises in Mexico (1994-5), East Asia 
(1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1998-9) and Argentina (2001-02)5. 
The main outcome of this debate is that, according to the conventional view, 
implementing a free-floating exchange rate regime and ample capital mobility, 
even when backed by responsible or credible economic policy –in line with 
Washington Consensus prescriptions6–, leaves emerging countries prone to the 
humors and short-term logic of capital accumulation. The conventional argument 
on the difficulties facing such countries is to attribute the volatility of foreign fi-
nancing to the irresponsible economic policies they adopt (Caramazza and Aziz, 
1998)7. The heterodox view, meanwhile, regards floating exchange rate and high 
capital mobility as a destabilizing combination of factors that intensify exchange 
rate crises in emerging countries. While Brazilian policy implementation was not 
without fault, the argument presented here, through comparative analysis, sup-
ports a more heterodox position. 
Support for post-Keynesian positions might be surprising given the certainty 
with which mainstream economists and international financial institutions, such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), consider liberalization of capital ac-
counts. They endorsed largely unregulated capital markets, capital mobility, and 
a perfectly flexible exchange rate (IMF, 20028). Under such a regime, domestic 
financial assets (securities) are regarded as perfect substitutes for international 
                                                     
5 These exchange rate and financial crises yielded a consensus among academics and 
policy makers as to the need to restructure the international monetary system as an indis-
pensable condition for the world economy, and particularly the emerging economies, to 
see a return to periods of expansion and economic prosperity. While there is a consensus 
that the international monetary system needs restructuring, the same cannot yet be said 
with regard to the mechanisms proposed to mitigate and/or put an end to instability in 
world exchange and financial markets. On this point, Eichengreen (1999, Chapters 6 and 
7), Eatwell and Taylor (2000), Davidson (1994, Chapter 16, and 2002, Chapter 14) and 
Isard (2005, Chapters 7 and 8) offer a summary of the main options for restructuring the 
international monetary system. 
6 The neoliberal measures advocated for emerging countries by the Washington Consen-
sus are as follows: (i) reduction or elimination of tariff barriers; (ii) free capital mobility, 
whether for foreign investment or for convertible currency transactions; (iii) fiscal disci-
pline; (iv) tax reform; (v) financial deregulation; and (vi) privatizations. 
7 It is important to add that the conventional theory argues that a responsible economic 
policy is based on flexible exchange rate, capital mobility and inflation targeting regime.  
8 In fact, one of the areas which concerned the IMF considerably about Argentina was its 
convertibility plan (Blustein, 2006). 
 
Revista Venezolana de Análisis de Coyuntura 120 
securities, and thus effective monetary policy is defined by parity between do-
mestic and international interest rates, i.e. monetary expansion brings down do-
mestic interest rates to levels below the international rate, leading to capital flight 
and consequent exchange rate devaluation, whose beneficial effects on current 
transactions come to generate an expansion in aggregate demand, which raises 
domestic interest rates until equilibrium is re-established in the balance of pay-
ments; symmetrical effects are produced by restrictive monetary policy. 
Economists from this liberal position argue that a flexible exchange rate re-
gime with capital account convertibility is fundamental for emerging countries to 
absorb the capital inflow and respond to the changing productive capacity in the-
se economies (Edwards and Savastano, 2000; Edison, Levine, Ricci and Slok, 
2002; Fischer, 1998; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). Accordingly, the benefits of a 
flexible exchange rate and unregulated capital flows for an emerging market is 
that these policies (i) reduce the sources of external vulnerability, and (ii) in-
crease the autonomy of monetary policy. Similarly, financial liberalization (i) allo-
cates efficiently savings (domestic and foreign), (ii) disciplines macroeconomic 
policies, and (iii) improves the economic growth performance.   
Set against this is the perceived need to preserve the autonomy of emerging 
countries’ fiscal and, more importantly, monetary policy. This has reinforced the 
opinion of heterodox economists and some policy makers of the necessity of 
introducing capital controls and an exchange rate regime that prevents excessive 
exchange rate fluctuations. They argue that such policy autonomy is fundamental 
to assuring sustainable economic growth and harmonious social development. 
This is particularly important given that developing countries suffer from more 
volatility than developed countries and this contributes to recessions of longer 
duration (Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik, 2004). Heterodox approaches insist 
on the need of an exchange rate regime that can prevent excessive exchange 
rate fluctuations and external vulnerability.  
3.1. Brazil: macroeconomic instability and economic growth à la stop-and-go 
In 1994, Brazil implemented the Real Plan, an exchange-rate based stabiliza-
tion plan designed to reduce inflation without producing a negative shock to 
growth. The Real Plan differed from Argentina’s Convertibility Plan in that it 
adopted a more flexible exchange rate anchor. At the launch of the Brazilian pro-
gram in July of 1994, the government's commitment was to maintain an exchange 
rate ceiling of one-to-one parity with the dollar. Moreover, the relationship between 
changes in the monetary base and foreign reserve movements was not explicitly 
stated, allowing some discretionary leeway. After the Mexican crisis in early 1995, 
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the exchange rate policy was reviewed and, in the context of a crawling exchange 
rate range, the nominal rate began to undergo gradual devaluation.  
The Real Plan was successful in reducing inflation from quadruple to single 
digits, due to the combination of exchange rate appreciation, high interest rates 
and a huge reduction in import taxes9. However, the expansion of demand, 
which had emerged from the fiscal side, and the overvalued exchange rate crea-
ted immediate difficulties for Brazil’s external sector where in 1994 the trade ba-
lance was around USD 10.4 billion in surplus and the current account was in 
balance, and from 1995 to 1998 the trade balance accumulated a deficit of 
around USD 22.3 billion and the current account registered a deficit around USD 
105.6 billion. As a result of this external imbalance, the Brazilian economy suf-
fered many speculative attacks on the real, a “mix of a ‘contagious crisis’ arising 
out of the effects on Brazil of the [Mexican crisis], East Asian and Russian crises 
and an outbreak of speculative activity triggered by market operators who per-
ceived evident macroeconomic imbalances in Brazil” (Ferrari Filho and Paula, 
2003). 
y floating the currency, it 
would be less vulnerable to future speculative attacks. 
nciples have been considered fundamental to 
Brazilian macroeconomic policy.  
                                                     
The macroeconomic position of the government was further aggravated du-
ring the 1998 presidential electoral campaign. Given the political constraints of 
being a candidate for reelection, FHC was loathe to weaken the currency regime 
and was forced to defend the real. This necessitated the Brazilian Central Bank 
(BCB) raising interest rates and selling dollar reserves (Spanakos and Renno, 
2006). Despite offers of support and efforts to lend credibility to Brazilian policy 
makers from the IMF, capital continued to flow out of the country and foreign 
reserves fell rapidly during the course of the campaign and even after the reelec-
tion of president FHC. Finally, in January 1999, under the circumstances of ma-
croeconomic imbalances and uncertainties about the Real Plan’s future, the FHC 
government changed the exchange rate and allowed the real to float. The go-
vernment had battled to protect the exchange regime at considerable cost in 
terms of reserves and growth, but now believed that b
But, given the history of inflation and the low appetite for risk among inves-
tors, the new floating regime was tested to see where the new range of the real 
would be. This pressure on the exchange rate let to the adoption of a set of eco-
nomic policies based on an inflation targeting regime (IT) and primary fiscal sur-
plus. Since 1999, these three pri
9 In August 1994, the Brazilian government reduced tariffs on imports of more than 4,000 
products, to a maximum of 20 percent.  
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Growth during the 1980s and 1990s had been low and volatile, but the ex-
pectation was that once inflation had been eliminated, Brazil could resume the 
high levels of growth it experienced from the post War period until the Debt Cri-
sis. Yet, since beginning of the 21st century, the Brazilian economy continues to 
display patterns of low and volatile growth. Moreover, since the Real Plan the 
GDP growth rate has been low and has had a ‘stop-and-go’ pattern: between 
1995 and 2007, the average GDP growth was 2.9%. This low economic growth 
can be explained by (i) the external vulnerability (from 1995 to 2003) due to the 
process of financial liberalization10, (ii) the high real interest rates (the average 
nominal interest rate, between 1995 and 2007, was around 22.9% per year), (iii) 
a recessive fiscal policy (maintenance of primary surpluses to reduce debt, espe-
cially since 1999), and (iv) an exchange rate appreciation (from 1995 to 1998 and 
again since 2003)11.  
Under the IT regime, monetary policy is taken as the main instrument of ma-
croeconomic policy. That is, the focus of monetary policy is on price stability, 
along with three objectives: credibility (the framework should command trust); 
flexibility (the framework should allow monetary policy to react optimally to unan-
ticipated shocks); and legitimacy (the framework should attract public and par-
liamentary support). Credibility is recognized as paramount in the conduct of 
monetary policy to avoid problems associated with time-inconsistency. Moreover, 
monetary policy is viewed as the most direct determinant of inflation, so much so 
that in the long run the inflation rate is the only macroeconomic variable that mo-
netary policy can affect. Finally, it is argued that monetary policy cannot affect 
economic activity, for example output or employment, in the long run. The re-
sults, however, suggest otherwise. Table 2 (annex) shows a consistently high 
interest rate and a sharp instability of the nominal exchange rate. For example 
from 2000 to 2007, the average nominal basic interest rate was 17.5% per year, 
and the exchange rate movement was quite unstable –from 2000 to 2003 it was 
devaluated and, since 2003, it has been appreciated. 
Monetary authorities have operated with a clear and heavy preference for 
maintaining low inflation. Given this priority, the BCB has maintained high interest 
rates which discourage monetary expansion and are recessionary in nature. Ri-
sing interest rate punishes firms, by reducing their access to credit, and workers, 
who lose their jobs when firms face difficulties, but reward rentiers and specula-
                                                     
10 The financial liberalisation included both facilitation to outward transactions (elimination 
of the limits that residents can convert real in foreign currencies, with the end of the CC5 
accounts) and inward transactions (fiscal incentives to foreign investors to buy domestic 
public securities). 
11 All average rates were calculated by the authors according to the data of Table 2. 
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tors, who hold public securities. Ironically, the expansion of Brazilian debt mar-
kets signaled in the Goldman and Sachs reports cited above has been consistent 
with a decline in output and employment, and, at the same time, increased the 
volume of public debt. 
In terms of fiscal policy, inflation targeting regimes view do not view fiscal 
policy as a powerful macroeconomic instrument (in any case, it is hostage to the 
slow and uncertain legislative process), instead “monetary policy moves first and 
dominates, forcing fiscal policy to align with monetary policy” (Mishkin, 2000). 
Since implementing the IT regime, the Brazilian government has maintained high 
target goals for primary surplus (between 3.75% and 4.25% of GDP during the 
period of 2000 to 2007), in order to guarantee the service of outstanding public 
debt. Despite the very significant fiscal constraint in this period, net public debt as 
a percentage of GDP is still high. Primary fiscal surplus has contributed to lowe-
ring debt, but the external vulnerability which was exposed in 2002-2003 led to 
an explosion of debt. Therefore, while fiscal surplus may be a medicine with long 
term value, it may have contributed to the conditions which increased short and 
medium term debt stock, which further emphasizes the point about volatility of 
growth associated with the Brazilian government’s adoption of the IT regime. 
As Table 2 (annex) shows, since the end of 2003, the nominal exchange rate 
has been appreciated trending towards overvaluing, basically due to both in-
crease of the trade surplus and capital flows. The growth of trade surplus is a 
result of an increasing of world demand for Brazilian products and an increase in 
commodity prices (mineral and agricultural) while capital flows have been attrac-
ted by high yield differentials between domestic and foreign bonds. Under these 
conditions, there has been a reduction of external indebtedness, an improvement 
of the indicators of external vulnerability and foreign reserves have increased 
from USD 33.0 billion in 2000 to almost USD 181.0 billion in 2007. However, 
there is a great deal of concern about the future of the trade balance and current 
account performances. This is due essentially to two reasons: (i) continuous real 
exchange rate appreciation can reduce the growth rate of exports, and (ii) the 
possible reduction in the volume of the international trade, mainly commodities, if 
a decline in the economic growth of USA and China were to materialize12.  
Despite the better international conditions and the growth of exports, from 
2002 to 2007, GDP maintained the same ‘stop-and-go’ pattern it has displayed 
                                                     
12 Brazilian exports are still very much concentrated on agricultural and mineral commodi-
ties, such as soy, steel and iron, natural resources, and technological low-intensive indus-
trial products, while there is an important presence in its import contents of products that 
rely extensively on technology. 
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since stabilization, and if not since the early 1980s. Both the average growth rate 
and the volatility of growth are insufficient for the needs of the Brazilian popula-
tion, augur poorly for investment, and are not competitive when compared with 
those of other large emerging countries over the same period.  
To conclude, the Brazilian economic performance, from 2000 to 2007, shows 
the following characteristics: (i) despite the fact that inflation rate was kept under 
control, its average rate was relatively high at 7.0% per year on average since 
the introduction of the IT regime; (ii) the annual nominal interest rate was around 
17.5%, while the average real interest rate was around 9.8% per year; and (iii) 
the average annual growth rate of GDP was only 3.4%. Thus, even without com-
parative analysis, there are reasons to reconsider the appropriateness of the IT 
regime for Brazil.  
3.2. China: economic growth with managed exchange rate and restricted 
capital inflows 
Annual average rate of GDP for China between 1995 and 2007 was a blister-
ing 9.6%. This high growth rate is largely due to the growth of the export sector13 
and is fueled by investment. Expansion of investment in China is very obviously a 
result of the (i) open-door policy initiated in the 1980s, and (ii) of state participa-
tion in bank credit and low interest rates14.  
Economic openness in Chinese economy was gradual and there were three 
phases in attracting capital flows (Shengman, 1999). Between 1980 to 1986 was 
a period of  “mutual learning” where Chinese authorities and population and fo-
reign investors learned from each other. Foreign direct investment (FDI) ventures 
in China started in the 1980s when the Special Economic Zones were created 
and, at the same time, economic policies were implemented15. The second pha-
se (1987-1991) was one of “getting ready,” during which laws and regulations 
were created and measures were adopted to attract foreign investment to diffe-
rent economic sectors and geographic locations. Finally, since 1992, there has 
been the “rapid increase” phased, characterized by the rapid transformation in 
                                                     
13 In the 1980s, the China’s share in the world trade was around 0.8% while in the 2000s it 
was almost 8.0%.  
14 According to OECD (2005), the relation banking credit/GDP, under a bank-based sys-
tem dominated by state-owned banks, has been almost double compared to OECD area. 
15 In the beginning, foreign direct investment (FDI) was highly regulated, but in the 1990s 
were introduced some changes to encourage FDI, such as effective tariffs on imports were 
reduced, the public corporations were modernized and the exchange rate regime change.  
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Chinese economy (from a planned economy to a market economy). During this 
period, China benefited from a shift in global allocation of private investment to-
wards emerging markets. According to Paula (2007, p.27), “[m]ajor changes in 
the functioning of the economy were introduced in the 1990s, such as encour-
agement of foreign investment, reduction of effective tariffs on imported inputs, 
the modernization of public corporations, the abolition of multiple exchange rates, 
and the introduction of convertibility for current account transactions”. 
China has been the principal recipient of foreign capital flows in recent years 
among emerging markets. Such capital inflows can cause several macroecono-
mic effects, such as, expanding the domestic money supply and putting pressure 
on the domestic prices and the exchange rate. However, this has not happened 
for the period under study here16. From 1997 to 2007, the average inflation rate 
was 0.91% per year. China did suffer from a short period of high inflation in the 
mid-1990s (more specifically in 1995 and 1996, when the average inflation rate 
was 8.5% per year), but since 1997 China has experienced periods of deflation 
(1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002) and low inflation rates, excepting 200417. In other 
words, inflation rates have been under control and moderate despite the tremen-
dous capital inflows that the Chinese economy has had to accommodate over the 
past decade and a half. This has been possible because of flexible monetary 
policy and fiscal austerity enjoyed by the Chinese monetary authorities, particu-
larly the Popular Bank of China (PBC), the Chinese central bank.  
The PBC has managed the domestic money supply in order to absorb the 
capital inflows and soften their effect on macroeconomic indicators. During the 
1990s, it applied credit restrictions to financial institutions, while in the 2000s 
monetary policy was more flexible –according to Table 3 (annex), the average 
interest rate was 3.0% per year, from 1998 to 2007. This means that the average 
real interest rate (average nominal interest rate divided by average inflation rate) 
from 1998 to 2007 was 2.1% per year. Moreover, China has shielded the domes-
tic financial system from these capital inflows because there are (i) limitations on 
the entry of foreign banks in the financial market, and (ii) convertibility restrictions 
on the foreign currency transactions of domestic financial institutions.   
During the Chinese transition from a closed to an open economy, the ex-
change rate regime has changed several times and has been the main instru-
ment of economic policy. After a long period of centralized and fixed exchange 
rate regimes, in the 1990s, the exchange rate was devalued and a managed 
floating exchange rate regime was adopted. The yuan has been de facto ‘fixed’ 
                                                     
16 Prices have increased since 2007. 
17 All average rates were calculated by the authors according to the data of Table 3. 
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to the US dollar since the end of the 1990s (Table 3, in annex, shows that rela-
tive stability of the exchange rate from 1995 to 2007). Since then, PBC’s inter-
vention to maintain a stable exchange rate has been significant largely due to 
capital control mechanisms on both inflows and outflows18. In 2005, the Chinese 
monetary authorities revaluated the exchange rate against the dollar of 2.1%. 
Moreover, they introduced a system in which the exchange rate would be deter-
mined by a basket of currencies. In other words, the PBC has acted as a market 
maker in the foreign exchange market. 
As mentioned above, the management of the exchange rate has been possi-
ble due to the existence of capital controls on both inflows and outflows. Accord-
ing to Zhao (2006), capital controls in China have the following objectives: (i) it 
helps direct external savings to desired uses; (ii) it keeps monetary policy inde-
pendent of the influence of international developments, under a context of a ma-
naged exchange rate regime; (iii) it prevents firms and financial institutions from 
taking excessive external risks; (iv) it maintains balance of payments equilibrium 
and keeps exchange rate stability; and (v) it insulates the economy from foreign 
financial crises.  
With a stable exchange rate, increasing trade surplus and inflows of FDI19, 
China has accumulated an impressive amount of international reserves (from 
USD 186.3 billion in 2000 to USD 1.53 trillion in 2007). As a consequence of the 
continuous trade surplus, the expressive accumulation of international reserves, 
the capital controls mechanisms and a low level of external debt, external vulne-
rability is low. This was evident by the insulation of the Chinese economy during 
the numerous emerging market crises since 1995, but especially during the 
Asian Crisis. 
Chinese fiscal policy has complemented monetary policy with a careful eye 
to maintain policymaking autonomy and limit external vulnerabilities. As public 
companies shifted towards mixed and private concerns, the government acquired 
considerable state and quasi-state debt. It did this through by increasingly sha-
ving the government deficit with a tendency towards balance. As a result of ‘con-
servative’ fiscal policy and growing state revenues, fiscal deficit has been 
                                                     
18 Capital controls in China has been used to keep monetary policy independent, to pre-
vent firms and financial institutions from taking external risks, to maintain balance of pay-
ments equilibrium and keep exchange rate and to avoid the economy from foreign 
financial and exchange rate crises. 
19 It is important to add that FDI has been attracted by the long-term growth perspective of 
Chinese economy.  
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relatively stable20 and the domestic debt has been under control. All of this helps 
to explain the limited vulnerability of the Chinese economy to the fits and starts 
more typical among emerging markets, particularly Brazil. They also have con-
tributed to an environment in which robust sustainable growth was possible. 
CONCLUSION 
This comparative study of Brazilian and Chinese macroeconomic policies 
and outcomes aims to address the puzzle of why the Brazilian economy, despite 
considerable liberal reforms, has not produced stable and robust growth. It has 
done this by comparing Brazil to peers in the BRICs group, gleaning information 
from recent research on the relationship between reforms and growth, and by a 
focused comparative case study with China. The paper agrees with the finding in 
the literature that broad liberal reform agendas do not necessarily produce stable 
and robust economic growth. It does find that certain policies do seem to have 
more of an effect in limiting external vulnerability and in producing growth, parti-
cularly policies that allow government’s to maintain autonomy of macroeconomic 
policies. This confirms Ferrari Filho and Paula (2006) who find that economic 
performance of BRICs countries is the result of the exchange rate regime, capital 
account convertibility and fiscal and monetary regimes adopted in each country.  
This suggests the necessity of (i) ensuring that monetary policy has a significant 
positive impact on the level of economic activity, (ii) directing financial markets 
toward financing development rather than rentier-like behavior, and (iii) creating 
efficient anti-speculation mechanisms to control (or regulate) movements of capital 
in order to prevent monetary and exchange rate crises and augment the autonomy 
of domestic decision-makers. Exploring the last issue, the main difference among 
Brazil and China is that, paraphrasing and adapting Stiglitz (2002), financial libera-
lization and capital mobility in the Brazilian economy in the 1990s were at the cen-
ter of its currency crisis, while China, due to their measures of capital controls, 
could manage monetary and fiscal policies pro-economic growth. Interestingly 
enough, in a panel survey of 49 developing countries between 1970-1995, Gasta-
naga, Nugent and Pashamova (1998) find that most policy reforms did not have 
much of an effect on attracting FDI, though capital controls were associated with 
an increase in FDI and the most important factor was economic growth. 
                                                     
20 From 1995 to 1998, the fiscal deficit was around 1.3% of GDP; from 1999 to 2002, it 
increased to 2.4% of GDP; from 2003 to 2006, it dropped; and in 2007 it increased to 
2.6% of GDP.  
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Uninterrupted and robust economic growth is the goal of all policy makers, 
especially in the developing world. Although academic literature has yet to pro-
duce clear causal relationships which explain the necessary components for 
such growth and how to bolster these components, empirical analysis of peer 
country performance gives valuable signals to policy makers. It may be difficult to 
say exactly why, with academic certainty, China has grown so robustly and con-
sistently. But when Brazil is compared against China, a strong case may be ma-
de for why growth may be weak and interrupted. 
Summing up, China’s case shows how gradual and careful management of 
capital account and contracyclical economic policies can reduce the external 
vulnerability and assure sustainable economic growth, while  Brazil’s case, on 
the other hand, shows how the adoption of a more liberal and orthodox econo-
mic policy, in terms of exchange rate and financial liberalization and capital ac-
count convertibility, has resulted in higher exchange rate volatility, higher 
interest rates, and a poor economic growth. Table 1, adapted from Paula (2007), 
shows a comparative synthesis of the analysis of the macroeconomic policy of 
Brazil and China.  
Table 1. Exchange rate regime and capital account convertibility  
of Brazil and China 








Brazil  From 1995 to 1998: 
semi-fixed 
Since 1999: Floating, 
with dirty floating 
From 1995 to 1998: 
cyclical monetary policy
Since 1999: Inflation 
targeting 
High High 







 Source: Author’s elaboration based on Paula (2007). 
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ANNEX 
Table 2. Some Macroeconomic Indicators of Brazilian Economy 
Macroeconomic 
Indicators/Year 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
IPCA (%) 22.41 9.56 5.22 1.66 8.94 5.97 7.67 12.53 9.30 7.60 5.69 3.14 4.46
GDP growth (%) 4.22 2.15 3.38 0.04 0.25 4.3 1.3 2.7 1.2 5.7 3.2 3.7 5.4
Interest rate (Selic), 
average (%) 
54.5 27.5 25.0 29.4 26.1 17.6 17.5 19.1 23.3 16.2 19.1 15.3 12.0
Exchange rate, 
average (R$/USD) 
0.92 1.00 1.08 1.16 1.81 1.83 2.35 2.93 3.08 2.92 2.43 2.17 1.92
Trade balance  
(USD billion) 
-3.5 -5.6 -6.8 -6.6 -1.2 - 0.7 2.6 13.1 24.8 33.6 44.7 46.5 40.0
Current account 
(USD billion) 
-18.4 -23.5 -30.5 -33.4 -25.3 - 24.2 - 23.2 - 7.6 4.2 11.7 14.0 13.6 1.5
Foreign reserves 
(USD billion) 
51.8 60.1 52.2 44.6 36.3 33.0 35.9 37.8 49.3 52.9 53.8 85.8 180.3
Fiscal surplus/GDP 
(%) 
0.24 -0.09 -0.88 0.01 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.8 4.3 4.0
Net public 
debt/GDP (%) 
29.1 29.6 30.4 35.4 44.5 45.5 48.4 50.5 52.4 47.0 46.5 44.7 43.0
Investment rate  
(% of GDP) 
18.3 16.9 17.4 17.0 15.7 16.8 17.0 16.4 15.3 16.1 16.0 16.5 17.5
Source: IBGE, IPEADATA and BCB. 
 
 
Table 3. Some Macroeconomic Indicators of Chinese Economy 
Macroeconomic 
Indicators/Year 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
CPI (inflation) (%) 10.1 7.0 0.4 -1.0 -0.9 0.9 -0.1 -0.6 2.7 3.2 1.4 2.0 2.1
GDP growth (%) 10.9 10.0 9.3 7.8 7.6 8.4 8.3 9.1 10.0 10.1 10.4 10.7 11.7
Average interest 
rate (%) 
n.a n.a. n.a. 6.85 3.66 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.8 1.8 2.5 2.8
Average exchange 
rate (Yuan/USD) 
8.35 8.31 8.29 8.28 8.28 8.28 8.28 8.28 8.28 8.28 8.19 7.96 7.76
Trade balance  
(USD billion) 
18.05 19.54 46.22 16.61 35.98 34.47 34.02 44.17 44.65 58.98 134.2 217.8 315.4
Current account 
(USD billion) 
1.6 7.2 37.0 31.5 21.1 20.5 17.4 35.4 45.9 68.7 160.8 164.2 156.0
Foreign reserves 
(USD trillion) 
0.075 0.107 0.143 0.149 0.158 0.168 0.216 0.291 0.408 0.614 0.822 1.068 1.53
Fiscal surplus/GDP 
(%) 
-1.4 -1.2 -1.1 -1.5 -2.2 -2.5 -2.3 -2.6 -2.2 -1.3 -1.9 -1.7 -2.6
Net public 
debt/GDP (%) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 17.7 18.9 19.2 18.5 17.9 17.3 18.1
Investment rate  
(% of GDP) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 34.1 34.4 36.3 39.4 40.7 42.1 41.6 44.7
Source: ADB, OECD and IMF. 
 
